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Engagement	in	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom		Cristian	Vaccari,	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London	and	University	of	Bologna.		
This	study	analyses	the	relationship	between	online	voter	mobilization	and	political	engagement	
in	Germany,	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom	during	the	2014	European	election	campaign.	
Internet	surveys	of	samples	representatives	of	these	countries’	populations	with	internet	access	
show	that	respondents	who	received	an	invitation	to	vote	for	a	party	or	candidate	via	email	or	
social	media	engaged	in	a	significantly	higher	number	of	political	activities	than	those	who	did	
not.	Moreover,	these	relationships	were	stronger	among	those	who	followed	the	campaign	less	
attentively,	as	well	as	in	countries	where	overall	levels	of	engagement	with	the	campaign	were	
lower	(Germany	and	the	UK)	than	where	they	were	higher	(Italy).	These	findings	indicate	that	
online	mobilization	may	contribute	to	closing	gaps	in	political	engagement	at	both	individual	
and	aggregate	levels,	and	thus	suggest	that	digital	media	may	contribute	to	reviving	democratic	
citizenship.			Accepted	for	publication	in	Political	Communication	on	25	May	2016.			 	
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Citizen	participation	is	a	crucial	pillar	of	democratic	governance	but,	as	Verba,	Schlozman,	and	Brady	(1995)	wrote,	many	people	do	not	participate	in	politics	because	nobody	asked	them	to.	By	making	it	easier	to	circulate	political	messages,	digital	media	enable	voter	mobilization	by	both	politicians	and	citizens,	potentially	expanding	the	ways	in	which	people	are	asked	to	participate	and	the	kinds	of	people	who	do	the	asking.	Whereas	offline	mobilization	has	been	shown	to	have	substantial	implications	for	political	engagement,	few	studies	have	assessed	the	relationship	between	online	mobilization	and	political	engagement.	Moreover,	due	to	the	lack	of	comparative	research	we	do	not	know	whether	systemic	factors	moderate	these	patterns,	and	if	so,	how.			
Voter	Mobilization	and	Political	Engagement	Research	on	political	participation	has	established	clear	links	between	political	mobilization	and	participation.	Rosenstone	and	Hansen	argued	that	“political	participation	arises	from	the	interactions	of	citizens	and	political	mobilizers”	(1993:	36).	Similarly,	Verba,	Schlozman	and	Brady	(1995)	demonstrated	that	recruitment	networks	rooted	in	local	communities	or	political	organizations	stimulate	participation.	Although	most	mobilization	efforts	by	parties,	campaigns	and	citizens	take	place	around	elections	to	encourage	voting,	mobilization	has	broader	implications	for	other	forms	of	electoral	and	non-electoral	participation	(Huckfeldt	&	Sprague,	1992;	Karp	&	Banducci,	2007;	Rosenstone	&	Hansen,	1993;	Wielhouwer	&	Lockerbie,	1994).			 The	increasing	popularity	of	digital	media	for	political	information	and	discussion	has	led	many	researchers	to	ask	whether	their	use	may	contribute	to	political	engagement.	Two	meta-analyses,	largely	comprising	U.S.	studies,	show	that	most	research	found	both	internet	(Boulianne,	2009)	and	social	media	use	(Boulianne,	2015)	to	be	positively	associated	with	engagement,	although	experimental	and	panel	studies	are	rare	and	doubts	remain	over	the	
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causal	nature	of	such	associations.	Research	has	also	found	that	individuals	combine	political	activities	occurring	on	the	web	with	those	in	physical	settings	rather	than	keeping	them	separate	(Oser	at	al.	2013).	Accordingly,	Gibson	and	Cantijoch	(2013)	showed	that	activities	such	as	contacting	politicians	and	signing	petitions	tend	to	be	performed	both	online	and	offline,	suggesting	that	political	action	is	integrated	across	the	web	and	in	physical	settings,	while	online	and	offline	practices	are	more	differentiated	when	it	comes	to	seeking	political	news.	Moreover,	Cantijoch	et	al.	(2015)	found	that	lower-intensity	online	political	activities,	such	as	seeking	information	on	the	internet,	spill	over	to	subsequent	levels	of	engagement	in	political	discussion	online,	and	Gil	de	Zúñiga,	Molyneux,	and	Zheng	(2014)	found	positive	relationships	between	political	self-expression	on	social	media	and	political	participation.	Taken	together,	these	studies	suggest	that	there	is	a	strong	relationship	between	online	and	offline	political	action	and	that	accessing	and	exchanging	political	information	on	social	media	may	be	conducive	to	political	engagement	both	on	the	web	and	in	physical	spaces.		Compared	with	the	robust	tradition	of	research	on	offline	mobilization	and	political	engagement	and	the	flourishing	of	studies	on	digital	media	and	political	engagement,	research	on	digital	mobilization	and	engagement	has	been	rare.	This	gap	needs	addressing	not	only	in	light	of	the	increasing	popularity	of	online	political	communication,	but	also	because	digital	mobilization	presents	some	theoretically	relevant	characteristics	that	may	have	important	implications	for	engagement.	In	particular,	compared	with	face-to-face	mobilization,	digital	mobilization	appears	to	be	less	differentiated	between	elite-	and	citizen-initiated	efforts	and,	partly	as	a	result,	more	inclusive	in	its	targets.			 Rosenstone	and	Hansen	(1993)	distinguish	between	direct	mobilization,	purposefully	orchestrated	by	political	actors,	and	indirect	mobilization,	which	occurs	in	citizens’	social	networks.	Whereas	the	boundaries	between	direct	and	indirect	mobilization	are	clear	in	face-to-face	environments,	they	may	be	blurrier	on	digital	platforms,	where	users	can	recirculate	
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content	originally	published	by	political	actors	in	ways	that	range	from	simple	reproduction	(by	forwarding,	sharing,	or	copying	and	pasting	those	messages)	to	creative	appropriation	and	personalization	(by	adding	one’s	thoughts,	editing	the	original	message,	or	repackaging	hybrid	messages	that	combine	official	and	personal	content).		Digital	mobilization	may	also	have	broader	scope	than	face-to-face	mobilization.	Because	offline	mobilization	is	costly,	politicians	predominantly	use	it	to	target	citizens	who	are	more	likely	to	participate	(Rosenstone	and	Hansen	1993).	The	rationality	of	this	strategy	and	its	negative	implications	are	confirmed	by	Enos,	Fowler	and	Vavreck	(2014),	who	found	that	get-out-the-vote	experiments	disproportionally	stimulate	turnout	among	citizens	who	are	more	likely	to	vote.	Relatedly,	Hassell	and	Monson	(2014)	found	that	campaigns	tend	to	send	fundraising	mail	to	previous	donors	rather	than	trying	to	activate	new	ones.	However,	when	it	comes	to	digital	mobilization,	Krueger	(2006)	found	that	email	reaches	a	more	inclusive	audience	than	offline	channels	such	as	direct	mail,	telephone	calls,	and	door-to-door	canvassing.	Because	the	marginal	costs	of	email	communication	are	practically	null,	political	organizations	can	afford	to	send	messages	to	any	citizen	on	their	list	rather	than	choosing	whom	to	mobilize	based	on	their	political	predispositions.	Whereas	studies	of	offline	mobilization	have	addressed	its	relationship	with	both	turnout	and	other	modes	of	political	engagement,	most	research	on	online	mobilization	has	only	focused	on	turnout,	generally	relying	on	randomized	field	experiments	with	treatments	delivered	via	email	and	social	media	in	the	United	States.	Green	and	Gerber	(2004)	found	that	emails	appealing	to	vote	have	negligible	effects	on	both	voter	registration	and	turnout	(see	also	Nickerson,	2007).	By	contrast,	Malhotra,	Michelson,	and	Valenzuela	(2012)	found	that	emails	by	official	sources	have	a	small	but	significant	positive	effect	on	turnout,	while	those	coming	from	voter	mobilization	organizations	have	no	effect.	Bond	and	colleagues	(2012)	
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found	that	being	exposed	to	a	Facebook	post	claiming	that	a	friend	had	voted	had	a	small	but	significant	effect	on	turnout.	However,	the	relationship	between	online	mobilization	and	political	engagement	writ	large	has	rarely	been	investigated.	The	only	notable	exception	is	Aldrich	and	colleagues’	(2016)	comparative	analysis	of	the	UK	2010	and	US	2012	elections.	Based	on	cross-sectional	survey	data,	the	authors	found	that	online	direct	mobilization	increased	campaign	participation	in	both	countries.	Moreover,	indirect	mobilization	(measured	without	differentiating	between	online	and	offline	modes)	enhanced	participation	in	the	UK,	while	in	the	US	online	indirect	mobilization	increased	engagement	among	younger	voters.	This	research	thus	suggests	a	strong	connection	between	online	mobilization	and	engagement.	However,	the	study	covers	two	countries	that	the	authors	characterize	as	similar	for	their	purposes,	and	does	not	address	the	implications	of	systemic	differences	between	them.	Interestingly,	however,	the	authors	find	that	US	parties	contact	more	voters	online	than	UK	parties,	consistently	with	comparative	research	documenting	the	greater	online	professionalism	of	US	political	actors	(Vaccari,	2013).	They	also	observe	that	mobilization	has	greater	potential	to	be	effective	where	overall	levels	of	participation	are	lower,	as	the	ceiling	for	its	effects	is	higher	(Aldrich	et	al.,	2016:	167).		To	summarize,	face-to-face	mobilization	is	an	important	predictor	of	both	turnout	and	other	forms	of	participation,	and	some	forms	of	digital	mobilization	can	also	stimulate	turnout.	However,	we	do	not	yet	know	whether	digital	mobilization	can	also	contribute	to	citizens’	broader	repertoires	of	political	engagement	besides	voting.	We	also	do	not	know	whether	online	mobilization	has	differential	implications	for	participation	among	citizens	with	high	and	low	levels	of	political	involvement.	Whereas	offline	mobilization	may	exacerbate	participatory	gaps	due	to	politicians’	strategic	targeting	of	resources,	the	potential	inclusiveness	of	online	mobilization	may	reduce	them,	or	leave	them	untouched.	
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because	little	comparative	research	has	been	conducted	on	this	topic,	we	do	not	know	whether	the	context	in	which	digital	mobilization	occurs	affects	its	relationship	with	engagement.	To	begin	addressing	these	gaps,	I	build	on	existing	theory	and	evidence	to	formulate	four	hypotheses	on	the	relationship	between	digital	mobilization	and	political	engagement	in	comparative	perspective.			
Hypotheses	Because	offline	mobilization	has	been	found	to	be	positively	related	with	political	engagement,	and	because	online	mobilization	has	the	potential	to	be	even	broader	in	scope	and	more	inclusive	in	its	targets	than	offline	mobilization,	I	expect	that	digital	mobilization	is	
positively	correlated	with	political	engagement	(H1),	even	after	controlling	for	other	relevant	antecedents.	Moreover,	I	investigate	whether	and	how	attentiveness	to	the	campaign	moderates	the	relationship	between	online	mobilization	and	engagement.	For	less	attentive	voters,	who	tend	not	to	accumulate	large	amounts	of	political	information,	the	socially	cued	information	provided	by	online	mobilization	may	provide	a	greater	marginal	incentive	to	become	engaged	than	for	more	attentive	voters,	who	may	already	have	accumulated	larger	stocks	of	political	information.	I	therefore	hypothesize	that	attentiveness	to	the	campaign	
moderates	the	relationship	between	digital	mobilization	and	political	engagement,	and	the	
relationship	is	negative	(H2).		 My	remaining	two	hypotheses	build	on	Aldrich	et	al.’s	(2016)	argument	that	mobilization	has	greater	potential	to	increase	engagement	where	and	when	citizens	are	not	already	highly	engaged.	I	thus	specify	H1	by	hypothesizing	that	the	positive	relationship	
between	online	mobilization	and	political	engagement	is	stronger	where	overall	levels	of	
engagement	are	lower	(H3).	By	the	same	logic,	where	overall	engagement	is	lower	mobilization	should	play	a	stronger	role	in	closing	the	gap	between	those	who	pay	more	and	
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less	attention	to	the	campaign.	Therefore,	I	specify	H2	by	hypothesizing	that	attentiveness	to	
the	campaign	moderates	the	relationship	between	digital	mobilization	and	political	
engagement,	the	relationship	is	negative,	and	it	is	stronger	where	overall	levels	of	engagement	
are	lower	(H4).		
Case	Selection	Testing	H3	and	H4	requires	observable	variation	in	the	levels	of	overall	citizen	engagement	with	the	election,	which	is	where	the	comparative	design	of	this	research	becomes	relevant.	The	three	countries	included	in	this	study—Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom—differ	under	many	respects,	such	as	their	party	systems,	media	systems,	and	levels	of	technological	diffusion.	However,	within	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	particular	study,	the	comparison	of	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	context	of	the	2014	European	elections	must	be	understood	as	a	device	allowing	to	control	for	different	levels	of	overall	engagement	with	the	campaign,	as	will	be	shown	below.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	the	data	were	collected	after	a	transnational	election	that	occurred	simultaneously	across	the	three	countries	allows	to	keep	constant	the	timing	of	the	vote,	the	electoral	system	(proportional,	with	small	variations),	and	the	purpose	of	the	vote	(the	election	of	Members	of	the	European	Parliament).		Although	politicians,	citizens,	and	the	media	generally	consider	European	elections	as	less	relevant	than	general	election,	the	extent	to	which	this	is	the	case	depends	on	country-specific	systemic	and	contextual	factors.	Since	the	first	European	elections	in	1979,	voter	turnout—a	useful	proxy	for	participation—averaged	73.3%	in	Italy,	53%	in	Germany,	and	33.8%	in	the	UK.	In	the	last	three	elections—in	2004,	2009	and	2014—average	turnout	was	64.7%	in	Italy,	44.8%	in	Germany,	and	36.3%	in	the	UK.	These	figures	suggest	that	the	Italian	population	tends	to	be	more	engaged	with	European	elections	than	the	German	and	British	ones.	Moreover,	in	2014	various	contextual	factors	raised	the	stakes	in	Italy	while	keeping	
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them	low	in	Germany	and	the	UK.	Just	three	months	before	the	European	vote,	Matteo	Renzi,	the	new	and	energetic	leader	of	the	centre-left	Democratic	Party,	replaced	fellow	party	member	Enrico	Letta	as	Italy’s	Prime	Minister.	Renzi	had	not	even	been	a	candidate	during	the	2013	general	elections,	and	thus	lacked	a	popular	mandate.	He	bet	that	a	strong	showing	of	his	party	in	the	European	elections	would	provide	such	legitimacy,	and	thus	took	a	high-profile	role	in	the	campaign,	presenting	it	as	a	clash	between	“hope	and	fear”	and	linking	the	fortunes	of	his	government	to	the	outcome.	The	main	opposition	party,	the	Five	Star	Movement,	accepted	Renzi’s	raising	of	the	stakes	and	ran	a	very	aggressive	campaign	centred	on	the	claim	that	it	would	top	the	poll	and	use	that	success	to	oust	the	Prime	Minister,	who	in	their	view	had	seized	power	illegitimately.	Thus,	the	two	main	Italian	parties	ran	high-profile	campaigns	claiming	that	the	European	vote	was	about	much	more	than	electing	a	few	dozens	of	representatives.	The	political	climate	was	much	less	heated	in	Germany—where	the	main	centre-right	and	centre-left	parties	had	joined	a	grand	coalition	after	the	2013	general	election	and	were	in	no	mood	to	challenge	each	other	too	harshly—and	the	United	Kingdom—where	the	two	major	parties	kept	a	low	profile	to	minimize	the	post-electoral	fallout	from	the	likely	success	of	Eurosceptic	UK	Independence	Party,	which	indeed	ended	up	topping	the	poll.	In	sum,	both	systemic	and	contextual	differences	indicate	that	comparing	Germany,	Italy	and	the	UK	offers	theoretically	fruitful	variation	with	respect	to	overall	levels	of	engagement	with	the	2014	European	election	campaign,	and	thus	allows	operationalizing	a	central	concept	in	my	hypotheses.		 Although	certainly	not	as	prominent	as	general	elections,	European	elections	are	far	from	irrelevant.	For	one,	voter	turnout	is	on	par	with	other	prominent	Western	democracies.	In	2014	the	country	with	the	lowest	turnout	among	those	studied	here	was	once	again	the	UK	with	35.6%,	but	this	percentage	was	essentially	identical	to	the	36%	recorded	in	the	United	States	midterm	elections	in	the	same	year.	Conversely,	the	country	with	the	highest	turnout	in	
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2014	among	those	studied	here	was	Italy,	and	at	57.2%	its	electoral	participation	is	barely	distinguishable	from	the	58%	observed	in	the	U.S.	2012	Presidential	elections.	Moreover,	as	discussed	above,	second-order	elections	often	acquire	political	significance	either	as	popularity	tests	for	the	incumbent	government,	as	noted	for	Renzi	in	Italy,	or	as	catalysts	for	the	ascendance	of	insurgent	parties,	as	was	the	case	with	the	UK	Independence	Party.	After	becoming	the	first	party	other	than	Labour	or	Conservatives	to	ever	top	the	poll	in	a	British	European	election,	UKIP	was	granted	major	party	status	by	the	UK	media	regulator.	This,	in	turn,	had	important	consequences	for	the	2015	general	election	campaign,	as	it	increased	the	amount	of	free	airtime	that	the	law	obliged	television	networks	to	grant	to	UKIP	and	ensured	that	its	leader	would	be	invited	for	the	first	time	in	history	to	at	least	one	of	the	televised	leaders’	debates.		
Data	As	discussed	above,	much	useful	research	on	the	effects	of	mobilization	is	based	on	experiments,	which	are	better	suited	to	establishing	causality	than	observational	analyses.	However,	experimental	studies	generally	focus	on	voter	turnout	as	dependent	variable,	neglecting	broader	modes	of	political	engagement	such	as	the	ones	addressed	here.	This	is	why	both	classic	(e.g.	Verba,	Schlozman,	and	Brady,	1995)	and	recent	(e.g.	Aldrich	et	al,	2016)	research	on	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	has	employed	surveys,	as	does	the	present	study.	Although	surveys	can	make	weaker	claims	to	internal	validity	than	experiments,	they	can	be	effective	in	achieving	external	validity,	especially	when	comparing	more	countries	at	the	same	time—a	task	which	would	be	logistically	much	more	challenging,	although	not	impossible,	when	employing	an	experimental	design.	That	being	said,	this	study	does	not	aim	to	make	strong	causal	claims	on	the	correlations	that	it	investigates,	but	hopes	to	highlight	patterns	hitherto	neglected	by	both	observational	and	experimental	inquiries.	
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This	research	focuses	on	mobilization	that	takes	place	online,	hence	its	population	of	interest	comprises	all	voters	who,	having	access	to	the	internet,	can	be	mobilized	in	such	a	way.	Accordingly,	I	rely	on	internet	surveys	based	on	samples	constructed	to	be	representative	of	the	population	with	internet	access	based	on	key	demographic	characteristics.	Because	the	population	of	interest	is	internet	users	rather	than	the	general	population,	coverage	bias	is	minimized.	Although	internet	surveys	based	on	panel	samples	suffer	from	several	known	biases	(e.g.	Baker	et	al.	2010),	studies	comparing	in-person	and	internet	surveys	(Sanders	et	al.	2006),	as	well	as	probability	and	nonprobability	samples	(Pasek	2015)	suggest	that	online	panel-based	samples	tend	to	produce	accurate	estimates	of	relationships	between	politically	relevant	variables,	even	though	they	may	not	provide	accurate	point	estimates	of	individual	variables.		The	surveys	were	fielded	by	IPSOS	between	May	27-June	20,	2014,	immediately	after	the	European	Elections	of	22-25	May.	For	each	country,	a	sample	of	1,750	respondents	was	constructed	via	online	panels	with	non-monetary	incentives.	Invitations	were	sent	until	the	sample	achieved	the	target	size	and	was	representative	of	each	country’s	population	with	internet	access	for	gender,	age,	education,	region	of	residence,	and	occupational	condition.	Response	rates	based	on	AAPOR’s	RR1	standard	(2011)	were	17%	for	Germany,	21.4%	for	Italy,	and	20.1%	for	the	UK.	Because	census-based	sampling	achieved	a	very	close	fit	between	sample	margins	and	population	margins,	no	weighting	was	required	for	the	German	and	Italian	samples.	However,	the	percentage	of	unemployed	respondents	in	the	British	sample	was	higher	than	in	national	figures,	and	as	a	result	the	British	data	were	weighted	to	ensure	that	sample	margins	matched	population	margins	on	occupational	condition	too.		
Addressing	Limitations	in	the	Data	
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Any	type	of	observational	data,	such	as	those	employed	in	this	study,	suffers	from	identification	problems	that	need	to	be	discussed.	Individuals	who	remember	being	mobilized	online	when	completing	a	survey	may	differ	systematically	from	those	who	do	not	remember	being	mobilized	with	respect	to	relevant	political	attitudes	and	behaviours.	Moreover,	due	to	the	strategic	conduct	of	political	actors	discussed	above,	those	same	characteristics	may	be	associated	with	the	probability	that	individuals	are	mobilized	(selection	bias).	These	two	patterns	may	also	compound	each	other,	as	respondents	who	were	prompted	to	act	as	a	result	of	being	mobilized	may	be	more	likely	to	remember	being	mobilized.	As	a	result,	regardless	of	whether	digital	mobilization	enhances	political	engagement,	political	engagement	may	also	increase	the	likelihood	of	(remembering)	being	mobilized	online,	as	political	actors	and	activists	tend	to	mobilize	citizens	likely	to	participate	in	politics	(reciprocal	causation).		Although	only	experimental	designs—and	to	a	lesser	degree	panel	surveys—could	fully	assuage	these	concerns,	five	factors	should	mitigate	them	in	the	context	of	this	study.	These	involve	theoretical	considerations,	the	specific	hypotheses	tested	in	this	study,	the	fact	that	the	survey	was	administered	online,	the	control	variables	included	in	the	models,	and	the	procedure	with	which	the	data	were	pre-processed.	Although	none	of	these	arguments	in	and	of	itself	may	nullify	selection	bias	and	reciprocal	causation,	taken	together	they	suggest	that	such	issues	should	not	be	seen	as	fundamentally	questioning	the	validity	of	the	claims	made	here.	 First,	on	theoretical	grounds,	I	have	argued	above	that	online	mobilization	is	cheaper	and	less	differentiated	between	direct	(elite-led)	and	indirect	(citizen-led)	modes	than	offline	mobilization,	and	as	a	result	it	tends	to	reach	broader	targets	(Krueger	2006).	Online	mobilization	should	be	driven	less	by	the	choices	of	strategic	political	actors	targeting	citizens	already	likely	to	participate	than	by	individuals’	desire	to	engage	their	online	contacts	without	any	specific	targeting	strategy	or	capacity.	Studying	predominantly	informal,	cheap,	and	
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bottom-up	mobilization	should	thus	be	less	prone	to	reciprocal	causation	than	studying	costlier	top-down	efforts	by	strategic	political	actors,	who	tend	to	mobilize	subjects	who	are	comparatively	more	likely	to	be	engaged	and	to	recall	being	mobilized.	A	further	theoretical	issue	that	should	be	taken	into	consideration	is	that	the	original	intent	of	the	mobilization	messages	studied	here,	as	will	be	shown	in	the	next	section,	is	to	get	recipients	to	simply	vote	for	one	party	or	candidate,	not	to	engage	in	any	form	of	broader	political	activism.	Even	assuming	that	the	intentions	of	the	senders	may	affect	the	characteristics	of	the	recipients	of	online	mobilization,	the	case	for	selection	bias	would	be	stronger	if	the	dependent	variable	was	vote	choice	or	voter	turnout—behaviours	that	the	messages	studied	here	did	attempt	to	influence—than	when	the	outcomes	of	interest—i.e.,	broader	patterns	of	political	engagement—differ	from	the	specific	actions	that	recipients	were	directly	asked	to	perform,	and	on	which	basis	they	were	presumably	targeted	by	the	authors	of	mobilization	messages.		 Secondly,	if	respondents	who	remembered	being	mobilized	online	differed	systematically	from	those	who	did	not	remember	that,	attentiveness	to	the	campaign	should	be	one	of	the	factors	behind	these	differences.	We	should	expect	respondents	who	paid	more	attention	to	the	campaign,	all	else	being	equal,	to	be	more	likely	to	recall	both	being	mobilized	and	participating	in	political	activities.	As	a	result,	the	strength	of	the	correlation	between	mobilization	and	engagement	should	increase	as	attention	increases.	However,	this	is	exactly	the	opposite	of	what	H2	argues,	i.e.,	that	the	strength	of	this	relationship	should	decrease	as	attention	increases.	Similarly,	selection	bias	should	be	stronger	in	contexts	where	overall	levels	of	engagement	with	the	campaign	are	comparatively	higher.	The	higher	the	stakes	in	the	election,	the	more	we	should	expect	respondents	to	remember	being	mobilized	and	taking	part	in	political	activities.	If	that	were	the	case,	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	should	be	stronger	where	overall	engagement	was	higher.	This	runs	counter	to	H3	and	H4,	which	predict	that	such	relationship	should	be	weaker	where	overall	engagement	
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was	higher.	In	sum,	even	if	selection	bias	inflated	estimates	of	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement,	it	would	actually	make	it	more	difficult	to	find	support	for	three	of	the	four	hypotheses	tested	here.	Thirdly,	social	desirability	and	acquiescence	to	the	interviewer	may	be	among	the	factors	causing	some	systematically	biased	over-reporting	of	both	mobilization	and	engagement.	However,	self-administered	online	surveys	such	as	the	ones	employed	for	this	study	suffer	less	from	these	biases	than	face-to-face	and	telephone	surveys	(Heerwegh,	2009;	Kreuter,	Presser,	&	Tourangeau,	2008).	Moreover,	studies	of	the	relationship	between	social	media	use	and	political	engagement	that	employed	panel	samples	have	been	substantially	less	likely	to	find	positive	and	significant	coefficients	than	those	based	on	general	population	samples	(Boulianne,	2015:	533)—which	again	should	make	it	more	difficult	to	reject	the	null	hypotheses	addressed	in	this	research.	Fourthly,	with	respect	to	modelling,	Vavreck	(2007)	has	shown	that	controlling	for	covariates	such	as	political	efficacy,	partisan	strength,	interest	in	politics,	campaign	attentiveness,	and	civic	duty	severs	the	correlation	between	errors	in	reported	exposure	to	political	stimuli	and	reported	engagement	in	political	activities.	Accordingly,	the	models	that	will	be	presented	below	control	for	interest	in	politics,	campaign	attentiveness,	political	efficacy,	ideology,	and	trust	in	parties.	(Unfortunately,	no	measure	of	civic	duty	was	available.)		Finally,	to	ensure	that	selection	biases	were	addressed	as	fully	as	possible	in	statistical	terms,	I	pre-processed	the	data	using	Propensity	Score	Matching	(PSM),	which	takes	into	account	the	fact	that	respondents	who	recalled	being	mobilized	online	may	systematically	differ	from	those	who	did	not	before	conducting	any	analysis	estimating	correlations	between	mobilization	and	engagement.	This	procedure	ensures	that	any	difference	that	will	be	found	in	political	engagement	between	respondents	who	were	and	were	not	mobilized	online	is	not	
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related	to	the	variables	included	in	the	models	that	make	respondents	more	likely	to	remember	being	mobilized.		 Following	Klofstad	et	al.	(2013),	I	applied	PSM	in	four	steps.	First,	I	estimated	the	probability	that	respondents	were	mobilized	online	with	a	logistic	regression	featuring	independent	variables	that	can	be	expected	to	predict	the	probability	that	respondents	recalled	being	mobilized	online.	The	variables1	included	in	the	model	are:	gender,	age,	education,	income,	frequency	of	social	media	use,	political	information	obtained	via	social	media,	websites,	newspapers,	radio,	and	television,	political	efficacy,	trust	in	political	parties,	interest	in	politics,	attention	to	the	2014	campaign,	left-right	self-placement,	country	of	respondent,	having	visited	party	or	candidate	websites,	and	intensity	of	political	discussion	on	social	media.2	Secondly,	based	on	the	regression	results,	I	estimated	a	score	for	each	respondent’s	propensity	to	report	being	mobilized	online.	Thirdly,	I	used	these	scores	to	match	respondents	so	that	at	least	one	subject	who	had	been	mobilized	online	was	matched	to	at	least	one	subject	who	had	not	been	mobilized,	allowing	multiple	matching	to	maximize	the	number	of	respondents	included	in	the	analysis.	The	resulting	dataset	comprises	1,598	treated	(mobilized)	and	1,437	untreated	(not	mobilized)	subjects,	which	constitute	the	sample	for	subsequent	analyses.	Finally,	I	used	the	propensity	scores	to	calculate	weights	for	the	matched	respondents,3	thus	ensuring	that	the	models	employed	to	test	my	hypotheses	are	more	affected	by	untreated	subjects	(i.e.,	not	mobilized	online)	who	are	similar	to	treated	
																																																								
1	Because	some	variables	had	a	relevant	number	of	missing	values,	I	imputed	missing	data	for	trust	in	parties,	political	efficacy,	interest	in	politics,	income,	and	frequency	of	political	information	via	social	media,	websites,	newspapers,	radio,	and	television.	The	values	were	imputed	on	the	basis	of	a	model	that	also	included	gender,	age,	education,	occupational	condition,	country,	and	ideology.	2	The	Nagelkerke’s	R-square	coefficient	for	the	regression	was	0.373.	3	The	weighting	formula	was	as	follows:	mobilized+(1-mobilized)/(1-propensity),	where	“mobilized”	is	the	dichotomous	variable	measuring	whether	respondents	recalled	being	mobilized	and	“propensity”	is	their	probability	of	being	mobilized	as	estimated	by	the	model.	This	formula	ensures	that	respondents	who	recalled	being	mobilized	were	weighted	as	1,	whereas	those	who	did	not	recall	being	mobilized	were	weighted	in	inverse	proportion	to	their	estimated	similarity	to	mobilized	subjects.	
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subjects	(i.e.,	mobilized	online),	and	less	by	untreated	subjects	who	are	not	similar	to	treated	subjects.	This	should	increase	our	confidence	that	the	variables	included	in	the	models	should	not	confound	the	relationship	between	online	mobilization	and	political	engagement.		
Variables	The	dependent	variable	measures	respondents’	political	engagement	as	the	number	of	activities	that	individuals	recalled	performing	in	the	previous	year	among	six	different	possibilities.	These	were	chosen	among	a	wider	range	of	items	included	in	the	survey	to	cover	a	broad	spectrum	of	activities:	trying	to	convince	someone	to	vote	for	a	party,	leader,	or	candidate;	participating	in	the	activities	of	a	political	party;	taking	part	in	public	meetings	and	rallies	on	the	elections;	signing	a	petition	or	a	referendum;	contacting	a	politician	to	support	a	cause;	and	discussing	national	politics	on	social	media.	Consistently	with	research	showing	that	online	and	offline	action	are	increasingly	intertwined	(Oser	et	al.	2013),	the	questions	did	not	specify	where	these	activities	had	been	performed	(with	the	exception	of	discussing	politics	on	social	media),	so	the	responses	capture	a	variety	of	behaviours	that	take	place	both	on	the	web	and	in	physical	settings.	The	Cronbach’s	α	reliability	score	across	the	six	items	is	0.668.	Table	1	shows	the	distribution	of	the	variables	in	the	three	countries,	as	well	as	the	wording	of	the	questions	employed	to	measure	them.	The	index	constituting	the	dependent	variable	was	calculated	by	adding	the	number	of	“yes”	answers	that	each	respondent	provided	(treating	“don’t	know”	answers	as	missing	values),	and	thus	ranges	from	0-6.	Across	all	three	countries,	the	mean	was	2.08	and	the	standard	deviation	was	1.67.	
Table	1	about	here	Online	mobilization	is	the	key	independent	variable	of	this	study	and	was	conceptualized	taking	into	account	Nielsen’s	(2011)	classification	of	different	campaigning	tools	according	to	their	complexity	and	diffusion.	Nielsen	(2011)	classifies	email	as	a	“mundane”	tool	and	social	
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media	as	“emerging”	tools.	In	order	to	incorporate	both	types	of	tools,	I	employed	two	different	questions	that	appeared	in	separate	batteries	and	referred	to	appeals	received	via	email	and	social	media.	Respondents	were	asked:	“Various	political	activities	are	carried	out	via	the	Internet.	During	the	past	12	months	have	you	received	email	intended	to	convince	you	to	vote	for	a	specific	candidate,	leader	or	party?”	and	“Various	political	activities	are	carried	out	on	social	networks	/	social	media	platforms	such	as	Facebook,	Twitter,	YouTube,	etc.	During	the	past	12	months	have	you	received	messages	intended	to	convince	you	to	vote	for	a	specific	candidate	or	party?”.	In	both	cases,	respondents	could	answer	“yes”,	“no”,	or	“don’t	remember”.	I	combined	these	variables	by	classifying	respondents	who	answered	“yes”	to	at	least	one	question	as	having	been	mobilized	and	those	who	answered	“no”	to	both	questions	as	not	having	been	mobilized.	I	excluded	from	the	analysis	respondents	who	answered	“don’t	know”	to	both	questions	and	those	who	answered	“no”	to	one	question	and	“don’t	know”	to	the	other.	The	variable	is	thus	dichotomous;	in	the	PSM-weighted	sample,	30.8%	of	respondents	were	classified	as	having	been	mobilized	online.			 The	questions	measuring	online	mobilization	do	not	discriminate	between	direct	(party-activated)	and	indirect	(citizen-initiated)	mobilization,	as	respondents	were	not	asked	to	recall	the	source	of	the	messages	they	may	have	received.	As	Aldrich	et	al.	(2016)	showed,	direct	and	indirect	mobilization	can	have	different	implications	for	political	engagement.	Importantly,	however,	they	found	direct	online	mobilization	to	be	very	rare	in	the	UK	(reaching	only	2%	of	respondents),	in	contrast	with	the	US	where	it	was	much	higher;	by	contrast,	indirect	online	mobilization	was	common	in	both	countries.	Since	European	parties	are	generally	less	keen	than	their	American	counterparts	to	employ	digital	media	for	campaigning	(Vaccari,	2013),	and	since	political	actors	strategically	target	mobilization	efforts	based	on	the	importance	of	the	outcome,	it	is	conceivable	that	party-initiated	direct	online	mobilization	in	the	2014	elections	may	not	have	been	particularly	high,	and	thus	that	most	
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respondents	who	recalled	being	mobilized	received	messages	from	other	citizens	rather	than	politicians.	Because	second-order	elections	tend	to	be	more	favourable	competitive	contexts	for	minor	parties	than	general	elections,	it	is	conceivable	that	mobilization,	engagement	and	attentiveness	may	be	more	concentrated	among	minor	than	major	party	supporters,	which	may	confound	the	relationships	between	the	main	variables	of	interest	to	this	research.	However,	when	we	divide	respondents	on	the	basis	of	whether	they	voted	for	a	major4	or	a	minor	party,	minor	party	supporters	were	only	slightly	more	likely	to	recall	being	mobilized	online	(32.5%	vs	29%)	and	their	levels	of	political	engagement	were	actually	lower	than	those	of	major	party	supporters	(1.92	vs	2.27	on	a	0-6	scale),	as	were	their	levels	of	attentiveness	to	the	campaign	(0.69	vs	0.77	on	a	0-1	scale).	Therefore,	the	data	do	no	suggest	any	substantial	and	consistent	bias	related	to	differential	levels	of	mobilization	and/or	engagement	among	supporters	of	major	and	minor	parties.	I	test	my	hypotheses	through	multivariate	Poisson	regressions,	which	are	appropriate	when	the	dependent	variable	is	a	count	variable.5	For	both	dependent	variables,	I	ran	four	separate	regressions,	adding	different	interaction	terms	at	each	step.	In	model	1,	which	does	not	include	interactions,	the	coefficient	for	online	mobilization	allows	testing	H1;	in	model	2,	an	interaction	term	between	mobilization	and	attention	to	the	campaign	allows	testing	H2;6	in	model	3,	an	interaction	term	between	mobilization	and	country	of	respondent	(treating	Italy	
																																																								
4	The	following	parties	were	considered	as	major:	Christian	Democratic	Union	and	Social	Democratic	Party	(Germany);	Democratic	Party,	Five	Star	Movement,	and	Go	Italy	(Italy);	Conservative	Party,	Labour	Party	(UK).	5	The	coefficients	in	the	bottom	rows	of	Table	2	indicate	that	the	data	are	not	overdispersed	and	that	the	regressions	fit	them	well.	Across	all	models,	the	ratio	between	the	Chi	square	and	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	is	always	lower	than	1,	which	indicates	that	the	models	actually	overestimate	the	standard	errors	(which	incidentally	were	calculated	using	formulas	for	robust	estimators).	6	Attention	to	the	campaign	was	measured	by	the	following	question:	“How	closely	did	you	follow	the	electoral	campaign	for	the	European	elections	in	May	2014?	Not	at	all	closely;	Not	very	closely;	Fairly	closely;	Very	closely;	Don't	know.”	“Don’t	know”	answers	were	coded	as	missing	data.	In	the	PSM-weighted	sample,	the	modal	category	was	“fairly	closely”	(41.2%	of	valid	responses).	
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as	reference	category)	allows	testing	H3;	finally,	in	model	4,	interaction	terms	between	mobilization,	attention	and	country	allow	testing	H4.	The	models	also	control	for	gender,	age,	education,	income,	frequency	of	social	media	use,	exposure	to	political	news	on	different	media	channels	(television,	newspapers,	radio,	social	media,	and	websites),	left-right	self-placement,	political	efficacy,7	trust	in	parties,	interest	in	politics,	country	of	the	respondent	(with	Italy	as	reference	category),	having	visited	the	official	website	of	a	party,	leader	or	candidate	in	the	previous	year,	and	the	proportion,	among	all	social	media	posts	published	and	read	in	the	previous	two	months,	of	messages	dealing	with	politics.	All	non-dichotomous	variables	have	been	normalized	to	range	between	0	and	1	to	facilitate	comparisons	across	coefficients.8	Results	are	shown	in	Table	2		
Findings	Model	1	tests	H1	by	assessing	whether	online	mobilization	is	positively	correlated	with	political	engagement.	The	coefficient	for	online	mobilization	is	positive	and	statistically	significant,	and	this	remains	the	case	across	all	models	even	after	several	interaction	terms	have	been	added.	The	consistently	positive	and	significant	correlations	between	digital	mobilization	and	political	engagement	support	H1.	
Table	2	about	here	Testing	H2	requires	estimating	whether	and	how	attentiveness	to	the	campaign	moderates	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement.	Hence,	Model	2	adds	an	interaction	term	between	mobilization	and	attentiveness,	which	captures	how	the	relationship	between																																																									
7	This	variable	combines	answers	to	three	questions	measuring	agreement	or	disagreement	with	the	following	statements:	“People	like	me	have	no	influence	on	what	the	government	does”;	“Politicians	are	interested	in	what	people	like	me	think”;	“Sometimes	politics	is	so	complicated	that	you	cannot	understand	what	is	happening”.	8	One	question	employed	to	construct	the	index	of	political	engagement	and	one	of	the	two	questions	measuring	online	mobilization	were	only	asked	to	respondents	who	reported	having	a	profile	on	at	least	one	major	social	networking	site	(82.1%	of	German,	88%	of	Italians,	and	85.9%	of	British	respondents).	Hence,	findings	should	only	be	generalized	to	social	media	users	in	these	countries.	
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mobilization	and	engagement	changes	at	different	levels	of	attention	to	the	campaign.	The	coefficient	for	this	interaction	term	is	negative	and	significant.	Together	with	the	fact	that	the	coefficients	for	both	mobilization	and	attention	are	positive	and	significant,	this	means	that	online	mobilization	is	positively	related	with	engagement	among	both	more	and	less	attentive	respondents,	but	this	positive	relationship	is	stronger	among	those	who	paid	less	attention	than	among	those	who	paid	more	attention.	To	clarify	the	implications	of	this	finding,	the	left	pane	of	Figure	1	plots	the	estimated	values	of	the	index	of	political	engagement	(with	error	bars	reporting	95%	confidence	intervals)	among	respondents	who	were	mobilized	online	(the	darker	bars)	and	those	who	were	not	mobilized	online	(the	lighter	bars)	at	different	levels	of	campaign	attentiveness,	setting	all	other	variables	to	their	mean.	The	figure	shows	that,	among	those	who	paid	more	attention	than	average	(one	standard	deviation	above	the	mean),	the	predicted	index	of	political	engagement	is	2.4	for	those	who	were	mobilized	versus	1.9	for	those	who	were	not	mobilized,	and	the	error	bars	indicate	that	the	difference	is	statistically	significant.	However,	if	we	look	at	respondents	who	paid	less	attention	than	average	(one	standard	deviation	below	the	mean),	the	gap	between	those	who	were	mobilized	online	and	those	who	were	not	is	substantially	higher	as	well	as	significant:	2.1	versus	1.3.	In	sum,	the	strength	of	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	decreases	as	attention	to	the	campaign	increases,	as	predicted	by	H2.	
Figure	1	about	here	Importantly,	all	models	also	include	dummy	variables	that	cluster	respondents	on	the	basis	of	their	country,	with	Italy	as	reference	category.	The	coefficients	for	both	Germany	and	the	UK	are	negative	and	significant	across	all	four	models,	indicating	that	overall	levels	of	engagement	were	substantially	lower	in	these	countries	than	in	Italy	once	all	the	variables	included	in	the	models	are	accounted	for.	(Running	the	same	models	with	the	UK	as	reference	category	showed	that	the	difference	between	British	and	German	respondents	is	not	
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statistically	significant.)	We	can	see	this	finding	as	a	confirmation	that	some	systemic	and	contextual	characteristics	of	Germany	and	the	UK	substantially	differentiate	these	countries	from	Italy	in	terms	of	political	engagement,	even	after	all	the	individual-level	variables	included	in	the	models	were	taken	into	account.	In	turn,	this	means	that	comparing	these	countries	effectively	allows	assessing	the	implications	of	different	levels	of	systemic	political	engagement,	which	is	required	to	test	H3	and	H4,	and	validates	the	case	selection	strategy	described	above.		 In	particular,	H3	claims	that	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	is	stronger	where	overall	levels	of	engagement	are	lower—in	our	case,	in	Britain	and	Germany	compared	to	Italy.	To	test	this	hypothesis,	Model	3	introduces	interaction	terms	between	mobilization	and	country,	with	Italy	as	reference	category.	With	this	set-up,	the	coefficient	for	mobilization	captures	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	among	Italian	respondents	only,	whereas	the	coefficients	for	the	interaction	between	mobilization	and	Germany/UK	capture	the	additional	effects	of	mobilization	among	respondents	in	those	countries,	in	addition	to	those	captured	by	the	variable	without	interactions.	As	can	be	seen	in	Table	2,	all	three	mobilization	coefficients	in	Model	3	are	positive	and	significant,	which	means	that	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement,	which	is	positive	in	all	three	countries,	is	relatively	stronger	in	Britain	and	Germany—where	levels	of	offline	engagement	were	lower	and	thus	mobilization	faced	a	higher	ceiling—than	in	Italy—where	engagement	was	higher	and	efforts	to	increase	it	met	a	lower	ceiling.	The	right	pane	of	Figure	1	above	illustrates	the	implications	of	this	finding.	In	all	three	countries,	the	differences	in	engagement	between	respondents	who	were	mobilized	and	were	not	mobilized	is	statistically	significant.	The	index	of	political	engagement	predicted	by	Model	3	for	a	typical	Italian	respondent	who	was	not	mobilized	is	1.9,	which	increases	to	2.4	for	a	comparable	respondent	who	was	mobilized.	However,	the	increase	in	predicted	engagement	is	slightly	bigger	among	
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both	British	(from	1.5	to	2.1)	and	German	(from	1.5	to	2.2)	respondents.	The	differences	between	countries	become	clearer	if	we	compare	relative	rather	than	absolute	figures:	the	predicted	engagement	for	mobilized	respondents	divided	by	that	for	non-mobilized	respondents	is	1.46	in	Germany,	1.43	in	Britain,	but	only	1.24	in	Italy.	In	sum,	online	mobilization	is	associated	with	political	engagement	more	strongly	where	overall	levels	of	engagement	are	lower,	as	predicted	by	H3.9	Finally,	H4	predicts	that	attentiveness	to	the	campaign	moderates	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	more	strongly	where	overall	levels	of	engagement	are	lower,	i.e.,	among	British	and	German	respondents	compared	to	Italian	ones.	To	test	this	hypothesis,	Model	4	in	Table	2	includes	three-way	interaction	terms	between	mobilization,	attention,	and	country	(again,	with	Italy	as	reference	category).	With	this	set-up,	the	results	can	be	interpreted	as	follows:	the	coefficient	for	mobilization	captures	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	only	among	Italian	respondents	who	did	not	pay	attention	to	the	campaign;	the	two-way	interactions	between	mobilization	and	Germany/UK	capture	the	additional	effects	of	mobilization	among	respondents	who	did	not	pay	attention	in	those	countries,	in	addition	to	those	captured	by	the	interaction-less	mobilization	coefficient;	the	two-way	interaction	between	mobilization	and	attention	captures	the	extent	to	which	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	changes	at	different	levels	of	attention	only	among	Italian	respondents;	finally,	the	three-way	interactions	between	mobilization,	attention,	and	Germany/UK	capture	the	additional	change	in	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	at	different	levels	of	attention	that	can	be	observed	among	British	and	German	respondents,	on	top	of	that	observed	among	Italian	respondents.																																																									
9	A	less	stringent	test	of	this	hypothesis	can	be	achieved	by	conducting	separate	regression	analyses	for	each	country	rather	than	on	a	pooled	dataset,	and	comparing	the	magnitude	of	the	coefficients	for	digital	mobilization	in	different	countries.	The	results	show	that	the	coefficient	for	online	mobilization	is	positive	and	significant	in	all	three	countries,	but	its	magnitude	is	higher	in	the	UK	(B=0.338,	SD=0.038)	and	Germany	(B=0.323,	SD=0.049)	than	Italy	(B=0.237,	SD=0.032).		
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As	can	be	seen	from	Model	4	in	the	last	two	columns	of	Table	2,	when	we	consider	country	differences	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	is	still	positive,	and	the	strength	of	this	relationship	decreases	as	attention	increases	in	Germany	and,	especially,	the	UK,	as	the	coefficients	for	the	three-way	interactions	are	negative	and	significant.	However,	this	is	not	the	case	in	Italy,	as	the	coefficient	for	the	two-way	interaction	is	still	negative	as	in	Model	2,	but	no	longer	significant.	As	predicted	by	H4,	the	strength	of	the	positive	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	does	not	change	as	attention	to	the	campaign	increases	where	overall	engagement	was	higher	(Italy),	but	it	decreases	significantly	as	attention	increases	where	overall	engagement	was	lower	(Germany	and	UK).10	
Figure	2	about	here	Effect	size	estimates,	plotted	in	Figure	2,	help	assessing	the	implications	of	these	findings.	Across	all	countries	and	all	levels	of	attention	to	the	campaign,	predicted	engagement	is	substantially	and	significantly	higher	among	respondents	who	were	mobilized	online	than	among	those	who	were	not.	(The	only	exception	is	British	respondents	highly	attentive	to	the	campaign,	among	whom	the	predicted	difference	between	those	who	were	and	were	not	mobilized	falls	just	inside	the	95%	confidence	intervals.)	However,	in	Italy	the	predicted	increase	in	political	engagement	for	respondents	who	were	mobilized	is	very	similar	across	low-	and	high-attention	voters.	Among	respondents	who	were	not	mobilized	online,	the	highly	attentive	are	predicted	to	engage	in	2.1	activities,	the	less	attentive	in	1.7	activities,	while	among	those	who	were	mobilized	online,	the	models	predict	that	the	highly	attentive	
																																																								
10	Similar	to	H3,	this	hypothesis	could	also	be	tested	by	running	separate	analyses	for	each	country.	Results	of	such	analyses	confirm	the	hypothesis,	as	the	coefficients	for	online	mobilization	are	positive	and	significant	in	all	three	countries,	but	the	coefficients	for	the	interaction	term	between	mobilization	and	attention,	while	being	negative	in	all	three	countries,	are	significant	only	in	Germany	and	the	UK.	This	confirms	that	campaign	attentiveness	moderates	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	in	Germany	and	the	UK,	but	not	in	Italy,	as	predicted	by	H4.	
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engaged	in	2.6	activities	and	the	less	attentive	in	2.2	activities.	These	differences	are	essentially	equal	in	size.	By	contrast,	in	Germany	and	the	UK	the	predicted	gaps	in	engagement	between	high-	and	low-attention	respondents	shrink	substantially	when	mobilization	also	occurred.	Model	4	predicts	that,	among	respondents	who	were	not	mobilized	online,	those	who	were	highly	attentive	engaged	in	twice	as	many	activities	than	those	who	were	less	attentive	than	average	(1.9	versus	0.8	in	Britain	and	1.8	versus	1.3	in	Germany;	both	differences	are	statistically	significant).	By	contrast,	among	respondents	who	were	mobilized	online,	predicted	engagement	was	essentially	identical	at	high	and	low	levels	of	attention	(2.2	versus	2.1	in	Germany	and	2.2	for	both	groups	in	the	UK;	none	of	these	differences	are	statistically	significant).	Being	mobilized	online	is	associated	with	a	predicted	increase	in	engagement	that	is	identical	among	the	more	and	the	less	attentive	Italian	voters	(0.4	on	a	0-6	scale),	but	in	Germany	the	increase	is	double	for	the	less	attentive	(0.8)	than	the	more	attentive	(0.4),	and	in	the	UK	it	is	four	times	as	large	(1.3	vs	0.3).		Moreover,	online	mobilization	seems	to	have	contributed	to	levelling	cross-country	differences	in	political	engagement	among	low-attention	voters.	British	and	German	respondents	who	did	not	follow	the	campaign	closely	and	were	not	mobilized	online	are	predicted	to	engage	in	fewer	activities	than	Italian	ones	(0.8	and	1.3	versus	1.7;	all	differences	are	statistically	significant),	but	among	low-attention	respondents	who	were	mobilized	online	predicted	engagement	increased	to	2.2	in	Italy	and	the	UK	and	2.1	in	Germany,	and	none	of	these	country	differences	are	statistically	significant.	Thus,	online	mobilization	may	have	potential	to	bridge	participatory	disparities	rooted	in	different	levels	of	campaign	attentiveness	both	within	and	between	countries.			 A	strong	note	of	caution	is	in	order	with	respect	to	the	causal	nature	of	the	correlations	presented	here.	As	discussed	earlier,	the	cross-sectional	and	observational	nature	of	the	data	
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implies	that	endogeneity	cannot	be	ruled	out.	Online	mobilization	may	be	positively	associated	with	political	engagement	because	mobilization	spurs	engagement,	but	it	may	also	be	that	those	who	are	already	engaged	are	more	likely	to	be	mobilized	online,	or	to	recall	being	mobilized,	or	both.	However,	some	of	the	mitigating	factors	discussed	above	should	also	be	considered.	On	theoretical	grounds,	online	mobilization	can	be	expected	to	be	less	strategic	than	its	offline	counterpart,	and	so	it	should	target	a	relatively	broader	set	of	individuals,	including	some	who	are	less	predisposed	towards	political	action	and	on	whom	mobilization	may	have	a	larger	marginal	impact.	Moreover,	to	the	extent	that	some	selection	bias	may	have	inflated	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement,	campaign	attentiveness	should	be	expected	to	further	enhance	this	bias,	and	so	in	theory	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	engagement	should	have	become	stronger	as	attention	increased	at	both	individual	and	aggregate	levels.	This	was	the	opposite	to	what	H2,	H3	and	H4	predicted,	and	the	fact	that	I	still	found	support	for	these	hypotheses	suggests	that	the	validity	of	these	findings,	while	limited	by	the	nature	of	the	data	and	in	need	of	closer	scrutiny	based	on	experimental	designs,	should	not	be	ruled	out.	Finally,	PSM	allowed	calibrating	the	multivariate	analyses	so	that	the	selection	biases	that	could	cause	endogeneity	are	accounted	for	as	rigorously	as	possible	within	the	limits	of	observational	data,	and	controlling	for	variables	known	to	cause	over-reporting	of	exposure	to	information	and	political	engagement	should	reduce	the	risk	of	spurious	results.		That	being	said,	experimental	research	is	urgently	needed	to	confirm	the	causal	nature	of	the	correlations	reported	here.	Unfortunately,	such	research	has	hitherto	focused	on	the	relationship	between	mobilization	and	voter	turnout,	as	opposed	to	broader	repertoires	of	political	engagement,	and	has	addressed	direct	rather	than	differential	effects—thus	overlooking	important	implications	of	mobilization	on	political	equality,	as	shown	by	Enos,	Fowler,	and	Vavreck	(2014).	More	work	is	also	needed	to	disentangle	what	types	of	online	
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mobilization—in	terms	of	sources,	timing,	content,	and	technology	used—may	play	the	strongest	role,	and	what	types	of	participatory	behaviours	are	more	likely	to	be	affected	by	them.	The	findings	of	this	study	thus	raise	important	new	challenges	for	experimental	research	on	digital	mobilization.		
Conclusions	This	study	has	shown	that	digital	mobilization	is	a	relevant	piece	of	the	puzzle	of	political	engagement,	which	in	turn	is	an	indispensable	component	of	democratic	governance.	The	findings	reported	here	represent	four	important	contributions	to	existing	knowledge	of	the	political	implications	of	online	mobilization:	first,	that	the	effects	of	online	mobilization	on	broader	patterns	of	political	engagement	may	be	even	stronger	than	the	effects	on	turnout;	secondly,	that	these	effects	are	differential	rather	than	uniform	across	different	types	of	voters,	and	should	thus	be	studied	as	such;	thirdly,	that	contrary	to	pessimistic	views	of	digital	media	as	reinforcing	political	inequalities,	online	mobilization	may	reduce	participatory	disparities;	fourthly,	that	both	direct	and	differential	effects	vary	as	a	function	of	context,	and	in	particular	of	the	overall	levels	of	engagement	observed	in	a	political	system	at	a	given	point	in	time.		 These	findings	have	particularly	important	implications	for	political	equality,	a	crucial	aspect	of	democratic	quality.	At	least	in	the	second-order	elections	studied	here,	the	increases	in	political	engagement	that	may	result	from	online	mobilization	seem	to	be	concentrated	among	the	less	attentive	segments	of	the	public.	This	suggests	that	digital	mobilization	may	foster	greater	political	equality	by	disproportionately	engaging	relatively	marginal	citizens.	This	conclusion	is	in	contrast	with	studies	of	offline	mobilization,	a	difference	that	I	have	argued	may	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	online	mobilization	reaches	broader	audiences	due	to	its	lower	costs	and	greater	social	embeddedness.	It	also	contradicts	the	first	generation	of	
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research	on	the	internet	and	politics,	which	argued	that	the	web	would	simply	reinforce	engagement	among	those	who	were	already	involved	(see	e.g.	Norris,	2003).	Since	then,	digital	media	has	evolved	to	allow	frequent,	informal	everyday	contacts	among	individuals,	some	of	which	involve	politics	and	may	attract	less	attentive	voters,	who	may	be	relatively	more	open	to	social	influence	precisely	because	they	are	less	involved.			 However,	online	mobilization	does	not	happen	in	a	vacuum.	All	else	being	equal,	the	more	engaged	the	citizenry	is	at	a	given	place	and	time,	the	more	difficult	it	is	that	online	mobilization	will	be	associated	with	substantial	participatory	boosts.	Conversely,	the	less	engaged	a	population	happens	to	be,	the	bigger	the	difference	that	online	mobilization	may	make.	These	findings	suggest	optimism	on	the	levelling	role	of	online	mobilization,	which	may	contribute	to	citizens’	engagement	when	and	where	such	engagement	is	especially	lacking	and	thus,	arguably,	most	needed.	However,	the	other	side	of	the	coin	is	that	online	mobilization	may	matter	less	when	and	where	participation	matters	more—in	high-stakes	contexts	where	overall	engagement	is	higher	and	greater	efforts	are	needed	to	eradicate	participatory	gaps.	Accordingly,	the	second-order	elections	studied	here	provide	a	less	compelling	test	of	the	role	of	online	mobilization	than	general	elections	would.	Comparative	research	featuring	a	broader	set	of	countries,	ideally	including	general	elections	and	spanning	across	different	electoral	and	non-electoral	periods,	is	needed	to	disentangle	these	puzzles.		 To	the	extent	that	a	more	engaged	citizenry	is	a	crucial	component	of	democratic	governance,	this	study	suggests	that	digital	mobilization,	far	from	being	just	an	appendix	of	parties’	electioneering	and	citizens’	repertoires	of	political	action,	may	play	an	independent,	positive	role	in	contemporary	Western	polities.	The	internet	now	provides	many	convenient	avenues	for	citizens	to	mobilize	and	be	mobilized	by	others	in	a	way	that	is	more	informal,	more	continuous,	and	more	closely	connected	with	individuals’	everyday	lives	than	(still	highly	relevant)	face-to-face	mobilization.	Two	decades	after	Voice	and	Equality	was	
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published,	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	citizens	participate	in	politics	is	still	that	someone	asked	them	to,	and	inequalities	in	who	gets	asked	and	who	does	not	are	still	reflected	in	who	participates	and	whose	demands	are	communicated	to	elites.	However,	this	study	has	shown	that	digital	media	are	promoting	new	and	potentially	more	inclusive	practices	of	political	mobilization,	with	potentially	momentous,	but	context-conditional,	implications	for	both	levels	of	and	inequalities	in	political	engagement.		 	
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Table	1	–	Frequency	of	Variables	Comprising	the	Index	of	Political	Engagement,	by	
Country		 Germany	 Italy	 UK	Tried	to	convince	someone	to	vote	for	a	party,	leader,	or	candidate	 37.4%	 50.2%	 38.3%	Participated	in	the	activities	of	a	political	party	 16.8%	 17.9%	 14.6%	Took	part	in	public	meetings	and	rallies	on	the	elections	 26.7%	 42.0%	 17.2%	Signed	a	petition	or	subscribed	a	referendum	 41.7%	 51.6%	 36.7%	Contacted	a	politician	to	support	a	cause	 15.0%	 18.3%	 29.4%	Discussed	national	politics	on	social	media	 49.8%	 55.8%	 52.3%	
N	 708	 1196	 1091		Note.	The	first	five	items	were	introduced	by	the	question:	“People	often	carry	out	various	activities	in	order	to	participate	in	politics.	During	the	last	12	months,	have	you	taken	part	in	any	of	the	activities	listed	below?	Yes;	No;	Don’t	remember”.	The	sixth	item	was	introduced	by	the	question:	“Various	political	activities	are	carried	out	on	social	networks	/	social	media	platforms	such	as	Facebook,	Twitter,	YouTube,	etc.	During	the	past	12	months	have	you	discussed	national	politics	on	social	media?	Yes;	No;	Don’t	remember”.	
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Table	2	–	Dependent	Variable:	Political	Engagement	(0-6	Index)		 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4		 B	 s.e.	 B	 s.e.	 B	 s.e.	 B	 s.e.	Mobilized	online	 0.299***	 0.021	 0.702***	 0.080	 0.216***	 0.031	 0.245*	 0.109	Mobilized*United	Kingdom	 	 	 	 	 0.141***	 0.048	 1.512***	 0.213	Mobilized*Germany	 	 	 	 	 0.161***	 0.054	 0.474***	 0.180	Attention	to	the	campaign	 0.489***	 0.056	 0.685***	 0.067	 0.479***	 0.056	 0.361***	 0.083	Attention*United	Kingdom	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1.269***	 0.168	Attention*Germany	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.219	 0.139	Mobilized*attention	 	 	 -0.509***	 0.094	 	 	 -0.042	 0.129	Mobilized*attention*United	Kingdom	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -1.591***	 0.242	Mobilized*attention*Germany	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.430*	 0.219	United	Kingdom	 -0.222***	 0.024	 -0.218***	 0.024	 -0.273***	 0.028	 -1.370***	 0.155	Germany	 -0.183***	 0.029	 -0.173***	 0.029	 -0.245***	 0.037	 -0.403***	 0.114	Ratio	of	political	messages	on	social	media	 0.742***	 0.046	 0.738***	 0.045	 0.728***	 0.046	 0.743***	 0.046	Visited	party	websites	 0.446***	 0.026	 0.452***	 0.026	 0.437***	 0.026	 0.460***	 0.025	Interest	in	politics	 0.259***	 0.050	 0.268***	 0.050	 0.268***	 0.050	 0.277***	 0.050	Trust	in	political	parties	 0.044	 0.029	 0.054	 0.030	 0.038	 0.030	 0.071*	 0.031	Political	efficacy	 0.525***	 0.055	 0.524***	 0.055	 0.532***	 0.054	 0.505***	 0.055	Ideology:	right	 0.100***	 0.029	 0.102***	 0.029	 0.106***	 0.029	 0.095***	 0.029	Ideology:	centre	 0.260***	 0.036	 0.258***	 0.035	 0.262***	 0.036	 0.243***	 0.036	Ideology:	left	 0.118***	 0.027	 0.113***	 0.027	 0.120***	 0.027	 0.097***	 0.027	Frequency	of	social	media	use	 0.188***	 0.058	 0.164***	 0.058	 0.183***	 0.058	 0.173***	 0.058	Political	information:	social	media	 0.258***	 0.061	 0.264***	 0.061	 0.269***	 0.061	 0.256***	 0.061	Political	information:	websites	 0.254***	 0.071	 0.250***	 0.071	 0.243***	 0.071	 0.252***	 0.071	Political	information:	newspapers	 -0.018	 0.039	 -0.010	 0.040	 -0.002	 0.040	 -0.015	 0.040	Political	information:	radio	 0.072*	 0.037	 0.071*	 0.036	 0.066	 0.037	 0.048	 0.035	Political	information:	television	 -0.043	 0.046	 -0.028	 0.046	 -0.042	 0.046	 -0.059	 0.045	Gender	(male)	 -0.083***	 0.019	 -0.081***	 0.019	 -0.084***	 0.019	 -0.079***	 0.019	Age	 -0.064	 0.045	 -0.091*	 0.046	 -0.065	 0.045	 -0.116*	 0.047	Education	 -0.117***	 0.030	 -0.123***	 0.030	 -0.107***	 0.030	 -0.118***	 0.030	Income	 -0.125***	 0.035	 -0.140***	 0.035	 -0.125***	 0.035	 -0.139***	 0.035	Intercept	 -1.226***	 0.066	 -1.381***	 0.073	 -1.196***	 0.067	 -1.047***	 0.080		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Pearson’s	Chi	square		 4373.630	 	 4361.211	 	 4365.94	 	 4370.497	 	Chi	square/degrees	of	freedom	 0.918	 	 0.916	 	 0.917	 	 0.919	 	Log-likelihood	 -7608.541	 	 -7592.852	 	 -7603.024	 	 -7547.639	 	Likelihood	ratio	Chi	square	 2801.622***	 	 2833.000***	 	 2812.656***	 	 2923.427***	 	Note.	N=2679	for	all	models.	Cell	entries	are	unstandardized	coefficients	for	Poisson	regressions.	***p≤0.001	**p≤0.01	*p≤0.05	
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Figure	1	–	Effect	Size	Estimates	of	Political	Engagement	from	Models	2	and	3,	with	95%	
Confidence	Intervals	
	
	Note:	the	values	are	calculated	on	the	basis	of	Model	2	(for	attention)	and	Model	3	(for	country)	in	Table	2.	The	estimates	are	based	on	the	means	across	the	pooled	sample	for	all	variables	apart	from	mobilization,	attention,	and	country.	The	values	for	Mobilization	are	0	(not	mobilized)	and	1	(mobilized).	The	values	for	Attention	are	one	standard	deviation	below	the	mean	(low	attention),	the	mean	(medium	attention),	and	one	standard	deviation	above	the	mean	(high	attention).	The	values	for	Country	are	1	when	the	effect	size	is	calculated	for	the	country	in	question	and	0	when	it	is	not.	
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Figure	2	–	Effect	Size	Estimates	of	Political	Engagement	from	Model	4,	with	95%	
Confidence	Intervals	
		Note:	the	values	are	calculated	on	the	basis	of	Model	4	in	Table	2.	The	estimates	are	based	on	the	means	across	the	pooled	sample	for	all	variables	apart	from	mobilization	and	attention.	The	values	for	Mobilization	are	0	(not	mobilized)	and	1	(mobilized).	The	values	for	Attention	are	one	standard	deviation	below	the	mean	(low	attention)	and	one	standard	deviation	above	the	mean	(high	attention).	
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